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Abstract 
In this article I attempt to demonstrate the relevance of the philosophy of time to 
psychiatric, psychological and psychoanalytic theories of development and therapeutic 
action. I choose to explore and analyse the writings of Martin Heidegger, arguably the 
twentieth century’s pre-eminent philosopher of time. I then develop links between his 
philosophy and Freudian theories of time, and in particular Freud’s notion of 
Nachträglichkeit, as advanced in the writings of André Green and Jacques Derrida. I 
conclude by advancing a range of temporal concepts that may be employed in the 
analysis of developmental theories and clinical approaches. In an accompanying article I 
undertake such an analysis, relating in particular to borderline conditions. 
 
 
Introduction 
In a broad sense, time, or temporality, permeates all aspects of our work as clinicians 
working in the fields of psychotherapy, psychiatry and psychology. When we think about 
our patients this occurs both in the retrospective sense when we consider case histories, 
developmental formulations and aetiology as well as in the prospective sense when we 
consider therapeutic goals and processes, the course of treatment and the nature of 
termination of treatment. With temporality being such an integral or essential element of 
our work, is there a way in which we can think about time philosophically, and bring this 
into a discussion of temporality in the clinic?  
 
In this article, I intend to undertake such an analysis through an exploration of the 
philosophy of Martin Heidegger, arguably the twentieth century’s pre-eminent 
philosopher of time, going on to explore the affinities his philosophy has with Freudian 
psychoanalytic theories of time, traces of which are found in Freud’s original corpus of 
work, but were then analysed or advanced more fully by psychoanalyst André Green and 
philosopher Jacques Derrida. Then in an accompanying article, I intend to explore how 
this theoretical analysis of temporality is relevant to our consideration of development 
and clinical work, focussing in particular on borderline conditions. 
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Heideggers’ Philosophy 
Martin Heidegger’s philosophy has been increasingly noted to have many affinities and 
relations with psychodynamic theory, psychotherapy and psychoanalysis. Later in his 
career, Heidegger (1959-1969) himself held the Zollikon Seminar regularly for over ten 
years with a group of psychiatrists and psychoanalysts in Switzerland. In these seminars 
Heidegger approached the task of elaborating the implications of his thought (the 
ontological, phenomenological and hermeneutic standpoints) for clinicians. Alongside 
this, his ideas were separately developed and adapted by Ludwig Binswanger and Medard 
Boss into schools of existential psychoanalysis (Binswanger, 1963; Boss, 1963, 1979). 
Heidegger (1959-1969) himself critically responded to this and elaborated what are some 
of the philosophical difficulties in building a systematic clinical approach (in a clinical-
scientific domain) from his own philosophical approach, which is concerned with 
different questions to do with broader philosophical domains such as ontology, 
phenomenology and hermeneutics.  
 
The question then becomes how philosophical ideas can be brought into dialogue with, or 
influence, thinking in a different though related clinical domain. There is already a 
precedent of this having occurred more broadly with Heideggerian philosophy and the 
clinical domain of psychoanalysis: Herman Lang (1997), for example, trained under 
Hans-Georg Gadamer (one of Heidegger’s principle followers) and wrote about 
Heideggerian and Lacanian conceptualizations of language and the unconscious; and 
Hans Loewald (1978, 1980), a student of Heidegger in the 1930s, and subsequently a 
preeminent North American psychoanalyst, wrote in an apparently orthodox Freudian 
style which nevertheless shows obvious influences from his hermeneutic and 
phenomenological training. In the writings of both of these thinkers, one can see the 
influences that Heidegger’s form of hermeneutic stance can have in its application to a 
clinical field. There are also representatives of the intersubjective, interpersonal and 
relational schools, such as Orange, Stolorow and Atwood (for example see Stolorow 
2002 and 2007; Stolorow, Atwood and Orange, 2002; and Stolorow, Orange and Atwood, 
2001) as well as other analytic thinkers with philosophical training or interests, such as 
William Richardson, Louis Sass, Alan Bass and André Green, who have drawn reference 
to Heidegger’s work and other thinkers of the hermeneutic tradition. And, finally, there 
are those philosophers who have either advanced a hermeneutic orientation and then 
engaged with the fields of psychoanalysis, psychotherapy and psychiatry (for example 
Hans Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur), or have developed their own orientation that has 
then been related to these fields at the same time as being related to but distinguished 
from Heidegger’s work (for example Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas).  
 
With the benefit of all of these vantage points, the discussion below will attempt to 
elucidate a hermeneutic frame or perspective from which to approach the theoretical and 
clinical domain of borderline experience. This will first involve an elaboration of aspects 
of Heidegger’s (1928) early writing, and in particular, his ideas around time and 
temporality. 
 
Heidegger’s own methodology was developed from two disciplines: the first being 
hermeneutics (loosely, the study of methods of interpretation, originally of scripture and 
other texts, but broadened to any form of human actions, utterances or practices amenable 
to understanding); and the second being phenomenology (loosely the study of one’s 
immediate perceptions and experiences). His early principle work Being and Time (1928) 
was the beginning part of an enormous project aimed at a general theory of Being 
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(ontology) which began with an exploration of the specific nature of the existence of 
human beings. What is significant for us, here, is that Heidegger, along with other 
eminent contemporaries such as Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein, elaborated a type of 
framework that undermines any decontextualized, individualistic notion of the self seen 
as a discrete autonomous agent, who divorced from the world processes the data of 
experience (perception, interaction with others) in a representational, algorithmic way. 
Heidegger’s notion of Dasein (literally “being-there”) and being-in-the-world indicates 
our irreducible and unsurpassable “embeddedness” in a concrete and contingent “life 
world”—we are always already in the world, practically immersed in the necessities and 
activities of life as an existential project into which we are thrown as finite beings. It is an 
inescapable context in which our being is already shared with others, housed in language, 
immersed in time within the horizon of death. In this context, our being, our self, is 
always an issue for us. But it is only from within this context that as selves we may begin 
to attempt to understand or explain who or what we are. This context is a background we 
can never fully master as we are always already a part of it. Heidegger holds that we exist 
within this context or horizon of being with an implicit understanding or what he might 
call a pre-understanding of how to go about things, with at the same time the possibility 
of explaining or explicitly understanding the nature of our being something which is 
furthest away from us.  
 
Heidegger’s exploration, with Nietzsche before him, of this notion of an existential limit, 
and the idea of self-estrangement and an opaque background to our being, I believe, is 
significant for our understanding of selfhood as clinicians. It has a bearing upon how we 
think about dimensions of the self that are implied in notions like the Unconscious. It also 
has a bearing upon how we can think about all of these concrete and very real elements of 
existence involved in the rich spectrum of our affective, interpersonal and embodied 
experiences. Now Heidegger affirms that all of these elements of existence are 
intrinsically temporal and to understand this we need to explore his project of Being and 
Time (1928) in some more depth. 
 
Heidegger’s Hermeneutic Ontology 
Heidegger opens his foundational work Being and Time (1928) by referring to the entire 
history of philosophy as a “forgetting” of the “question of Being”. In talking about this 
“forgetting”, Heidegger (1928) is referring to philosophical thought from Plato and 
Aristotle onwards but is also including the modern scientific disciplines that emerged out 
of metaphysics in the seventeenth century and subsequent humanistic disciplines such as 
psychology and anthropology. Heidegger’s project begins with an attempt to recover this 
“question of Being”—find an opening or a clearing in which to think about Being again. 
This will require a methodology of interpretation, a hermeneutic method, which will 
involve partly reading what has become omitted or hidden in philosophical discourse (but 
somehow remained implicit to it) in order to reveal it and allow it to be openly 
apprehended. The other element of his method of approaching the “question of Being” 
for Heidegger will be phenomenological insofar as it concentrates on what is 
experientially immediate and apparently self-evident to all of us. It is governed by 
phenomenology's principle of principles - the principle of presence and of the presence in 
self-presence, such as it is manifested in the Being that we ourselves are (our experience 
of what seems self-evident including our self awareness or self-consciousness). It is this 
proximity of Being to itself, and our questioning of Being to our own Being, that 
intervenes in Heidegger's choice or deduction of the exemplary form of Being for his 
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analysis—what he calls Dasein (literally “being there”). Heidegger’s point is that we who 
are close to ourselves, we interrogate ourselves about the meaning of Being. This 
interrogation, as a process of interpretation, occurs within this “hermeneutic circle of 
Being”.  
To explain what is important about this notion of a “hermeneutic circle” I could refer to 
moments when Heidegger (1929) links this starting point for interpreting Being with the 
Kantian origins of an attempt to instigate a “Copernican Revolution” in metaphysics. This 
revolution relates to a reversal of the common-sense view of the subject-object 
distinction, specifically regarding the knowing subject and the object known. Just because 
it locates the ground of any knowledge of any object within the knowing subject, Kant's 
revolution represents, as Heidegger recognized, the first serious attack on the traditional 
Platonic-Aristotelian approach to insight into the nature of things by focussing on that 
which needs to be known (the objects themselves or “things in themselves”). For Kant, in 
contrast to the Aristotelian tradition, thought does not know the thing itself without any 
intermediary: thought merely interprets what sense-intuition “reports”. The concept is not 
“necessarily in conformity with its object”; in fact, the Copernican Revolution proclaims 
the reverse: it is the object that, to be known, must conform to the knowing requirements 
of the knower – for Kant, the transcendental categories. These transcendental conditions 
govern the synthesizing operation of our immediate apprehensions and our pure concepts 
- they, in a way, permit existent things to be recognized. The “beyond” of this knowing, 
the noumenal, is unknowable. Kant thus brought us to the point where the ground of the 
presence or absence of an object in knowledge is to be seen within the nature of the 
knower. He has thus created the possibility of a new form of enquiry - namely, “the 
metaphysics of the subject”. Heidegger's approach would be, then, that the invocation of 
transcendental laws regarding the how-and-what we can know concerns precisely the 
condition and nature of being - and moreover, the meaning of “Being” and the copula 
“is” in themselves. This, of course, is precisely the original motivation and orientation for 
Heidegger’s “fundamental ontology” (the hermeneutic and phenomenological enquiry 
into the Question of Being). It is not the place to explore the relationship between Kant’s 
transcendental philosophy and Heidegger’s fundamental ontology any further so much as 
to point out that for Heidegger the hermeneutic circle simultaneously refers to self-
understanding (the phenomenology of self-interpretation) and philosophical 
understanding (interpreting Being evolving through the history of philosophy). Both 
relate to thinking about Being through interpretation and approaching this through what is 
present phenomenologically and not objectively. For Heidegger, phenomenological 
interpretation is descriptive and opens a space to make thinking possible: it is about 
potentiality.  
Heidegger’s own revolution, then, is to re-situate and broaden out our notions of 
understanding and interpretation beyond them being, simply, methods of reading or 
procedures of critical reflection. Understanding and interpretation become modes of 
being: the universal, pre-reflective mode in which we conduct ourselves in the world is 
itself of a hermeneutic nature. The world is familiar to us through basic, intuitive ways of 
going about things, where tacit and intuitive approaches, pragmatic forms of know-how, 
predominate. Most originally, Heidegger argues, we do not begin by understanding the 
world simply through the acquisition of objective facts, algorithms or representational 
knowledge from which we can establish or derive universal propositions, laws, or 
judgments that, to a greater or lesser extent, correspond to the world. The world is already 
implicitly intelligible to us, familiar to us, something with which we are at home. Explicit 
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understanding and interpretation follow this, or co-exist with this. The hermeneutic circle 
of interpretation, then, refers to the interplay between our self-understanding and our 
understanding the world. Hermeneutics now deals with the meaning, or limits and lack of 
meaning in our own lives. This begins with individuals and their own situation, or 
situatedness. 
 
Heidegger on Temporality 
Arguably the most significant element of his existential analysis relates to the 
embeddedness of any form of behaviour or action within the situatedness of worldhood 
involving time and temporality. Importantly, Dasein is formally characterized by 
Heidegger as having that fundamental self-relation—that “comporting itself to its own 
Being”—which, above being directed towards and absorbed in any specific worldly 
activity or goal in the way I have discussed, is ruled by an inherent and intrinsic 
“directedness” of its own. This manifests itself in any the specific activities we engage in. 
Put loosely this unifying “directedness” in Dasein is referred to by Heidegger as the 
“Care Structure”: the fact that Dasein intrinsically has “concern” in its existence, no 
matter what this concern may be for, in its dealings and comportments. At the heart of 
this is the notion of “Temporality” Heidegger later introduces in Being and Time, as well 
as that of “Ontological Difference” which Heidegger introduces in The Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology (1982) around that concept of Temporality.  
 
Through these notions, Heidegger wants to assert that Dasein is not “in time” like other 
things in its world are. For we are not simply in a “present” which is as a function of its 
“past”, on the way to a “future” which will come to be as a function of that “past and 
present”. Rather, our existence is uniquely led by its “future” - a “future” which is, in 
effect, guiding, pulling or directing the present in a particular direction out of its past. 
Specifically, when we are absorbedly coping with a particular task this “future-driven” 
quality, or “future-directedness”, manifests itself in an ability of Entwurf (Projection) 
which allows a form of Umsicht (practical circumspection) to lead it through specific 
tasks and more broadly how it goes about anything. This overall directedness is seen by 
Heidegger to be the unifying aspect of all of our concerns in the world. In this way, 
Dasein's Being has a unifying “Care Structure” which makes it a “perpetual coming to 
be” at any possible level. Such capacities as Entwurf and Umsicht are ineliminable and 
intuitive and not able to be nomologically understood. They cannot be built up from 
component abilities in some incremental way. They are not programmatic - understood in 
terms of explicit rules, algorithms, prototypes, formulae. The capacities are general, 
global, presiding, primordial. They are a base intuition. To understand that this is not just 
a simple assertion on Heidegger's behalf we must also carry through the formal structure 
that this concept exists within and in terms of. Heidegger has disclosed it through his 
hermeneutic phenomenological analysis of Dasein's way of Being within a greater 
ontological framework driven by a fundamental “Question of Being”. This means that 
Heidegger is in no way making assertions about a type of traditional subjectivity 
conceived of as a “conscious subject” or “transcendental ego” or “human being or soul”. 
Entwurf and Umsicht, here, only have an import insofar as they are ontological, within 
Heidegger's own analytic of the ontology of Dasein. This analytic, ultimately, was 
alluded to as extending to the notion of “Care” which offers a unifying structure to the 
being that is Dasein, understood within that horizon of Temporality that separates Dasein 
off, purportedly, from other beings by virtue of an “Ontological Difference” that resides 
in Being as a whole.  
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It only really needs to be noted here, that Heidegger attributes to Dasein's understanding 
of the roles and identities to which it comports itself, a deep notion of evolution and 
historicity. Not only are they embedded within the ongoing complexity of Dasein's own 
existence, but also the evolving history of the culture of Dasein. That is, their fluidity - 
their being adapted, changed, improved - is not only continuing throughout Dasein's own 
ongoing existence, but has been evolving hitherto over the entire history of the culture of 
which Dasein is a part. 
 
This ability is at the heart of what Heidegger calls Dasein's “absorbed coping” with the 
world. Heidegger, invariably, gives it the formal name Verstandnis, or “Understanding”, 
in the sense of the German verb verstehen - “to be competently able to”, “to understand 
how to” (and not in the sense of an explicit “awareness” or “comprehension”). In this 
way, Heidegger is referring to this ability as an ability of insight - rather than an expert 
knowledge or a trained expertise. Furthermore, it must not be confused with any specific 
aptitude, competence or skill - a kind of “know-how” ability, such as being talented at 
shearing or motorcycle repair. Though Verstandnis certainly intervenes in any such 
activity, it is not, in any way, the specific skill, competence or capability itself. This is 
why, in some ways, Heidegger's constant discussions of artisan activities, such as 
“hammering”, may have been a poorly chosen metaphor to link to Verstandnis. For it is 
only something that allows any possible activity to be performed in a flexible, adaptive 
and, most importantly, intelligent way. 
 
Across sections 31-32, Heidegger (1928) links this general, abstract ability of Verstandnis 
with the abilities of Sicht (“sight”) and Entwurf (“projection”). At my level of discussion, 
sight is identifiable with Umsicht (“practical circumspection”), the ability which presides 
over any activity and allows creative adjustments to be made - a flexible and open-ended 
approach to the activity that allows Dasein to adapt to any changes and novel 
circumstances that may arise - so that the activity may always be brought to completion - 
to fruition and the fulfilment of its goal. In terms of Umsicht being characteristic of 
Verstandnis, it involves no will towards a concrete conceptualisation of the end-product 
or end-point of the activity – vis-à-vis a formal “blueprint”, image or discursive plan of 
the completed activity; but, rather, it involves an intuitive “working understanding” of the 
way the activity is “progressing” towards a completeness - and the way this progression 
can be further aided, or left unhampered and uninhibited, as opportunities knock or 
obstacles present themselves. 
 
And it is the process that operates when this intuitive Umsicht works its way through 
activities that Heidegger entitles Entwurf. This Entwurf, ultimately, is what Dasein is 
conscious of as its overall goal - it is what allows Dasein to see in its current situation and 
circumstances a manifestation of what is progressing toward that goal. In this way, the 
goal is only ever explicitly known as a “rough sketch” or “intuitive notion” of what is 
otherwise just appropriately “seen” as something which must be projected towards - 
something that must be achieved through acting upon what is currently given. When 
Dasein judges that nothing else needs to be done, then the activity has been completed - 
the goal, previously nothing more than a “towards which”, has been attained. Any 
consciousness or declaration of an explicit goal is only derivative to the underlying 
“projection” of the “towards which” upon the current circumstances, situation and 
“predicament” manifesting themselves to Dasein in the environment of the activity. They, 
in a sense, are only ever ontically derived from the preontological “absorbed coping” that 
is already active. 
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This ontological approach to Dasein's mode of being - Existenz - then, offers us a new 
way of looking at traditional concepts such as “subject” and “object”, “consciousness”, 
“ego”, “soul” as well as, ultimately, “being”. Importantly, Dasein is formally 
characterized by Heidegger as having that fundamental self-relation - that “comporting 
itself to its own Being” - which, above being directed towards and absorbed in any 
specific worldly activity or goal in the way I have discussed, is ruled by an inherent and 
intrinsic “directedness” of its own. This manifests itself in any more specific directedness 
Dasein comports itself towards, whether in the world,  to other Daseins in the world, or to 
itself. Although I cannot really elaborate upon this any more, this unifying “directedness” 
in Dasein is known simply by Heidegger as the “Care Structure”: the fact that Dasein 
intrinsically has “concern” in its existence, no matter what this concern may be for, in its 
dealings and comportments. 
In the second division of Being and Time (1928) Heidegger does establish the broadest 
context for the Care structure around Dasein reaching its potentiality for being in terms of 
authenticity and inauthenticity not only in relation to finite origins of thrownness (one’s 
immediate concerns within a contingent, factical, limited background and context) but 
also in relation to the unsurpassable horizon of death. Heidegger characterizes death as 
non-relational, and being-towards-death as, thus, seeming to represent an individual, non-
relational existential horizon. Dasein can authentically exist within this horizon or can 
inauthentically flee from this horizon by an immersion in public anonymity, what he 
refers to as das Man or “the They”. At the same time, Heidegger does also characterize 
an authentic form of Care of others, or being-with-others when he describes solicitude: 
Dasein’s capacity to leap ahead (vorspringen) of the Other and assist in a return to 
authentic being in the world, a return to a realisation of potentiality for being. In outlining 
the concepts of being-towards-death and solicitude Heidegger opens his analysis of 
temporality into the existential fields of mortality and communal life. 
 
Tentative Affinities between the Thought of Heidegger and Freud 
on Time 
Heidegger and Freud share a philosophical heritage in which Kant’s “metaphysics of the 
subject” and the subsequent developments of neo-Kantian and Hegelian thought were met 
by Nietzsche’s nihilistic ideas about the various challenges posed to self-interpretation by 
unconscious motivations and forms of illusion and self-deception. Both Heidegger and 
Freud developed approaches to interpretation that paid close attention to reading or 
interpreting symptomatically what is omitted, hidden, implicit, forgotten or repressed. 
After Nietzsche, this sensitivity to what is absent, what needs to be revealed, disclosed or 
brought to light, is also an  “historical” sensitivity: for Heidegger, there is an historical 
narrative of the forgetting of the question of Being and this narrative within the history of 
philosophy correlates with his hermeneutic exploration of Dasein’s own tendencies to 
immerse or become purposefully absorbed in its environment (Umwelt) working towards 
various goals and projects (Entwurfen), often not mindful of the existential context into 
which we have been thrown (our “thrownness” or Geworfenheit) and its horizons (death, 
our own facticity or what Heidegger would term our historicity). Heidegger would hold 
that this mode of being in the world conceals or omits a sense of the Being that is 
immanent and implicit to our going about things but not understood in any explicit way. 
Furthermore Heidegger would refer to the initial tendency for ourselves (qua Dasein) to 
understand ourselves and the world as falling into the terms of objective presence (what 
he calls “ontical” understanding), seeing ourselves as the objective entities that we are in 
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the objective world in which we exist. This form of “ontical” understanding entails all of 
the possible technical and scientific elaborations of understanding self and the world as 
objective entities and is aligned with the philosophical tradition of Platonic-Aristotelian 
metaphysics which understands the world in terms of objective presence. Part of 
Heidegger’s project in Being and Time was to elucidate that this forgetting of Being 
philosophically also entails a distortion in the understanding of time. Put simply time may 
be officially and scientifically understood as an unfolding of successive objectively 
present moments in a linear sequence of past, present and future, something that is 
different, Heidegger will hold, to his phenomenological description of time he will 
attempt to arrive at in Being and Time. This is representative of the forgetting of the 
temporal nature of Being. A primary role of interpretation in Heidegger’s ontology will 
be to open up a space in which this Being can be thought, revealing the hidden and 
undisclosed nature of the temporality of Being. As I have shown, fundamental to this 
understanding is a conception of the phenomenological or existential structure of 
temporality, Care (Sorge) which is based in Dasein’s thrownness (historicity, factical 
context), projection (being towards) and how this is involved in its present concern for its 
world within a broader horizon of solicitude and being-towards-death. 
  
We can think of an analogous type of understanding of what is hidden and what becomes 
disclosed or revealed when we think of Freud’s approach to the interpretation of neurotic 
symptoms. Neurotic symptoms have an historical nature understood in terms of a theory 
of infantile sexuality and modes of fixation, repression and regression occurring within 
the delayed action of unconscious memory. This historical nature is akin to thrownness 
insofar as it acts on the present and projects itself (and I mean this both in a temporal 
sense and a Freudian sense) into current activity including the transferential enactments 
and the remembering, repeating and working through in the analytic session. This hidden 
form of temporality (unconscious memory, conflict, transference) is counterpoised with 
the more regulated, official, objective time of the analytic session in the analytic work 
and an objective sense of what is the past and what is the present. The analytic work, 
interpretive work, makes historical links and the nature of this interpretive work, working 
in time, and working with the historical unconscious, is what is of interest here.  
 
Freud and the Temporality of the Unconscious 
This idea of an historical Unconscious is problematic because, for Freud, the unconscious 
is also often referred to as timeless. We may be familiar with many moments in which 
Freud refers to the unconscious as “timeless”. For example, in his (1915) article “The 
Unconscious” which appears in his papers on metapsychology, he states:  
 
 
The processes of the system Ucs. are timeless; i.e. they are not ordered temporally, are 
not altered by the passage of time; they have no reference to time at all. Reference to 
time is bound up, once again, with the work of the system Cs  (p. 186). 
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Elsewhere in the paper he does refers to the relational and temporal aspects of the 
unconscious:  
 
 
It is a very remarkable thing that the UCs. of one human being can react upon that of 
another, without passing through the Cs….descriptively speaking the fact is 
incontestable (p. 193). 
 
 
And: 
 
the greater part of what we call conscious knowledge must in any case be for very 
considerable periods of time in a state of latency, that is to say, of being psychically 
unconscious. When all our latent memories are taken into consideration it becomes 
totally incomprehensible how the existence of the unconscious can be denied (p. 171). 
 
Here, we are looking at a particular site in Freud’s topographical writings where an issue 
appears that re-emerges in many situations in Freud’s work: how atemporal unconscious 
elements (drives, motivations, conflicts) are influenced by memory; how the Unconscious 
acts as a system of memory; and how the Unconscious operates relationally as opposed to 
intrapsychically. One further implication of this relates to how, after Freud renounces his 
own Seduction Theory, within his conceptualizations of the intrapsychic and unconscious 
basis of neurotic conflict, any conflict or impact introduced by actual or real past 
traumatic events operates psychopathologically.  
 
At this level, we need to elucidate the ways in which memory acts upon the present, and 
how, simultaneously, the present (interpretation, working through) acts upon the past via 
memory. Memory, here, can become a bidirectional constructive or representative 
process. 
 
If we place these issues in the context of an attempt to understand the manner in which 
the Freudian analyst understands the historicity of the analysand and the unconscious 
work they undertake, we can begin to see how tensions arise when we attempt to 
understand the temporal or historical nature of the interpretations made: do the 
interpretations make causative links which relate different forms of objective presence 
(worldly or intrapsychic events), or do they uncomfortably cross a boundary between the 
objective presence of worldly objective events  and an atemporal intrapsychic realm 
which is either understood in itself as an objectively present “psychic apparatus” (of 
drives, instincts) or simply a realm of interpretation (of symbolic primary processes). 
 
The hermeneutic exercise of interpreting the exploration and use of temporal concepts in 
Freud’s works, ultimately, is a difficult and complex one: there is no single work which 
elaborates upon a theoretical formulation of time, and Freud adopts varying and 
sometimes contradictory elaborations of notions of history, memory and temporality as 
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his project developed over thirty to forty years, and arguably as an open, transforming 
and sometimes unresolved set of theoretical, clinical ideas within psychoanalysis and 
beyond in realms such as anthropology, theology and aesthetics. Fortunately, a 
psychoanalytic theorist, with some philosophical literacy, André Green, conducted this 
form of hermeneutic project to enable us to make further links between Freud’s thinking 
of time, and Heidegger’s hermeneutic ontology. I will now explore this as a means of 
establishing some of these links that will become useful when I come to contemplate 
developmental and clinical time in the accompanying article. 
 
Green, Nachträglichkeit and Fragmented Time 
In the work Time in Psychoanalysis (2002) and related papers, Green attempts to extract 
Freud’s thinking about time, memory and working through across the course of Freud’s 
works (pre-psychoanalytic, Structural, Topographic) to extract and map out a 
psychoanalytic theory of time steeped in Freudian origins. A central concept of Freud’s 
that he focuses upon is Nachträglichkeit which is often translated into English as deferred 
action and into French as après-coup. Green emphasizes that these translations do not 
emphasize the bidirectional nature of time that is captured in this concept: memory or 
past experience can remain suspended in conflict, fixation, repression or disavowal, so 
that any action on psychic life can be re-appear at a later time with a form of deferred 
action; but, conversely, a current experience can trigger a movement backwards in time, a 
regression which returns retroactively to the past state, reintroducing the necessity of its 
action and the possibility of working through by another means. And so, the bidirectional 
nature always refers to both a delayed effect and the related reconstruction, or working 
through of it…to this, Green (2002, p. 41) adopts a pun around the word re-presentation, 
capturing the idea of a deferred return, and a new reconstruction. I will emphasize this 
notion of re-presentation to capture Green’s rediscovery of the bidirectional action of 
Nachträglichkeit as an active and constructive form of memory. 
 
Green (2002, pp. 9-21) shows how this bidirectional action of time, appeared from the 
beginning and throughout Freud’s writings but that this manifests in different renderings 
of temporality which seem to co-exist, whereby he concludes that time for Freud is 
heterochronic or fragmented. Freud’s psychosexual theories, for example in The Three 
Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905), uphold a theory of sexual development that is 
sequential, linear and progressive, but that elements of time in this theory are 
bidirectional: it involves sexual diphasism where unresolved elements of infantile 
sexuality are repressed and re-present in puberty and adulthood to be worked through, 
entailing bidirectional elements of fixation and deferred action as well as regression. The 
Interpretation of Dreams (1910) refers to the pure present of the unconscious psychic 
dream space and the manner in which primary processes work upon unconscious memory 
traces, re-present them, where the dream is a form of phantastic memory construction, 
analogous to screen memory: the bidirectional nature of psychic life is the move. In the 
landmark paper Remembering, Repeating and Working Through (1914) Freud introduces 
a focus upon repetition and enactment: what cannot be represented (or remembered in the 
sense of a conscious, constructive act), continues to repeat itself (re-present, in the sense 
of enactment as a more primitive form of action memory), and this process manifests in 
the psychoanalytic setting with transferential enactment. This is extended when Freud, in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) develops the concept of repetition compulsion as a 
manifestation of the death instinct, and Green argues, of all drives or instincts. In fact, 
with the Id supplanting the unconscious in this latter phase of Freud’s writings (not 
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replacing it, for the structural and topographic models by no means intertranslate or 
substitute for one another), both unconscious atemporal drives, and traces of experience, 
somehow exist within non-psychic space through which ego function has as its role to 
bind and represent these aspects of the Id. Green (2002) also highlights the significance 
of Mourning and Melancholia, where Freud differentiates between mourning and 
melancholia through a more articulated theory of intrapsychic object relations, which can 
be the site of forms of pathological memory. This links object relations to another form of 
re-presentation. He also refers to socio-cultural memory, primal fantasy (the Freud of 
Totem and Taboo and Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego) having 
bidirectional quality. 
 
I would add that Freud (in Beyond the Pleasure Principle) uses the term Bindung 
(translated as binding) to explain these ego processes and the phenomenon of repetition 
compulsion. Bindung also refers to a process in which psychic trauma, seen as an 
extensive breach of the ego’s boundaries, is compulsively repeated in symbolic activity 
(one recalls his discussion of the Fort-Da game). And finally, there is a later notion of 
Binding (such as it appears in An Outline of Psychoanalysis) as one of the major 
characteristics of Eros and the life instincts—the move to self-preservation, ego integrity 
and self-unity, as opposed to the destructive, degenerative, fragmentation of the death 
instinct (Entbindung). I introduce these versions of Freudian Bindung because they refer 
to movements toward consciousness formation, ego integrity, self unity, and later the 
self-preserving instinct to compulsively work through trauma via unconsciously driven 
symbolic relational enactments to re-establish integrity and unity. These forms of 
Bindung are forms of re-presentation, action and integration that are temporal, in Green’s 
sense of bidirectional time, and link to self-function or ego function. Interestingly, when 
using these later conceptualizations of Bindung Freud does not return to explore the 
question of unconscious time. For example, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle he states: 
 
 
At this point I shall venture to touch for a moment upon a subject which would merit 
the most exhaustive treatment. As a result of certain psycho-analytic discoveries, we 
are to-day in a position to embark on a discussion of the Kantian theorem that time and 
space are ‘necessary forms of thought’. We have learnt that unconscious mental 
processes are in themselves ‘timeless’. This means in the first place that they are not 
ordered temporally, that time does not change them in any way and that the idea of 
time cannot be applied to them. These are negative characteristics which can only be 
clearly understood if a comparison is made with conscious mental processes (p. 28). 
 
We see here that in this re-assertion of a timeless unconscious Freud simultaneously turns 
to the requirement of directing more attention toward an understanding of conscious 
mental processes, the integrity and functioning of the ego. Here we have something of a 
critical juncture in Freud’s elaboration of his metapsychology which I will not develop 
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too much here: there is one movement in Freud’s later work which focuses on the 
centrality of ego function and would no doubt be later adopted by the Ego Psychology 
schools; the other movement focussing on the death instinct (entbindung) in its necessary 
relationship with the life instincts. What is paradoxical about death is that as we have 
seen with the early Heidegger it may represent an ultimate horizon of non-relational, non-
temporal individualization but within the existential context, it is something that is 
projected towards, it forms a temporal horizon. With regard to this latter movement, I 
would comment though that we see death figuring as a temporal concept in Heidegger’s 
notion of Dasein as being-towards-death, projecting towards death, finding its individual 
authenticity in this relation to death. Extending this, there is room to analyse the creative 
potential of the Freudian death instinct and this may fit within the problematic of the 
absence of temporality in the Freudian Unconscious. 
 
In all of this, Green (2002) uses Nachträglichkeit as a bridging concept for what he sees 
as a heterochronous, fragmented temporality, with an analogous history in the analysand:  
 
 
Freud’s heritage leaves us with an uncompleted task and we know only too well that 
he was constantly re-working history in all its forms. For history, he believed, could 
not be reduced to what is left behind in the form of visible traces (accessible to 
consciousness) nor to that of which traumas conserve the memory. There is not one 
history (great or small), but several histories within the spheres of the individual, 
culture and the species, which are interrelated, interwoven, overlapping and sometimes 
opposed – each living according to its own rhythm and its own time….And rather than 
giving up and opting for the simplest solution – a strictly ontogenetic point of view – 
we should have the courage to do justice to this complexity, attempting to gather in the 
scattered threads of this web in order to bring together the multiple figures of time  
(p. 27). 
 
This analysis has been pursued to extend notions of temporality from the foundations of 
Heideggerian hermeneutic ontology to a point that we can begin to think about 
developmental and clinical time beyond the beginnings of conceptualizations of 
thrownness, Care, Sicht, Entwurfen and being-towards-death. Green’s (2002) analysis 
shows us that in the complex and open system of Freud’s works, memory processes, as 
re-presentations, are complex and heterogonous (enactment, narrative memory, screen 
memory, dream work, intrapsychic object relations, primal fantasy and myth) due to the 
heterochronicity of time. What underpins this is a complex, heterogonous, and to Freud, 
timeless, field of unconscious traces, drives, instincts, processes or, relatedly, Id. This 
could be considered, in Heideggerian terms, to be an ontological field never separable 
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from a hermeneutic horizon. Freud goes so far as to elaborate ego and binding processes 
that relate to memory work and re-presentation and Green states that although 
experience, finally, is heterochronous and heterogonous, ego or self function pursues 
cohesion, binding and meaning to constitute itself. This is work in time, although there is 
a double forgetting of time: “The unconscious is unaware of time but consciousness does 
not know that the unconscious is unaware of time” (p. 37). Ironically, his thinking of 
time, as Green (2002) has established it from Freud’s work, itself has a bidirectional 
nature to it: Green is retroactively establishing a meaning and cohesion in Freud’s work 
around time, where there wasn’t one. 
 
For Heidegger, the Freudian Id and unconscious would be incoherent or aporetic concepts 
with metaphysical underpinnings, if not thought of in terms of forgetting, a pre-
Ontological background, a limit or a horizon. It is not inconsistent with a hermeneutic 
ontological orientation to think of personal time (and then developmental and clinical 
time) in terms of traces and re-presentations, within a broader perspective of Care, 
projection, futurity and being-towards-death. In this way, both the past and the future 
collapse within bidirectionality, where Being is a process of becoming, and the past is 
seen in terms of elements of potentiation and Nachträglichkeit as re-presentation.  
 
Derrida, Nachträglichkeit and Différance 
Freudian Nachträglichkeit (and along with it Verspätung or delay/deferral) played a 
significant role in the development of Derrida’s ideas, appearing in a lecture entitled 
‘Freud and the Scene of Writing’ at a time where Derrida is introducing a key 
deconstructive analysis of the suppression of writing in the metaphysical tradition which 
favours a metaphysics of presence, immediacy and speech, such as he had taken it up in 
the essays published in De la Grammatologie in 1967. 
 
Derrida is interested in the fact that with the Freudian concepts of Nachträglichkeit and 
Verspätung there is an apprehension of time that is characterized by belatedness and that 
there is consequently no pure and simple present. Derrida questions the notion of 
presence and self-presence and looks subsequently into the opposition between the 
conscious and the unconscious in Freud, showing how Freud subverts it. According to 
Derrida, there does not exist in Freud an Unconscious that would be situated in a precise 
place and would belong to a definite time, an Unconscious that would have to be 
retranscribed in another place and another time (the conscious). The past is contained in 
the present. And Derrida (1978) makes reference to this Freudian basis in Writing and 
Difference: 
 
That the present in general is not primal but, rather, reconstituted, that it is not the 
absolute, wholly living form which constitutes experience, that there is no purity of the 
living present – such is the theme, formidable for metaphysics, which Freud, in a 
conceptual scheme unequal to the thing itself, would have us pursue (p. 266). 
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All these considerations will open the way to Derrida’s concept of différance, which are, 
Derrida writes, “the Freudian concept of trace must be radicalized and extracted from the 
metaphysics of presence which still retains it.”  
In the context of his deconstructive analysis, Derrida is interested in the fact that Freud 
relies upon the metaphor of a writing machine to represent the functioning of the psyche. 
In the 1925 text “Note on the Mystic Writing-Pad” Freud seizes upon the metaphor of a 
children’s toy writing machine, the Wunderblock (the Mystic Writing-Pad) to describe 
the functioning of the psychic apparatus in terms of the production of a permanent trace 
in memory whilst maintaining ongoing, indefinite capacity to receive new stimulation or 
percepts. In practical terms, the Mystic Writing-Pad is a device constituted of a slab of 
wax covered with a transparent sheet made of two layers: a transparent celluloid sheet 
(used as a protection) and a sheet of thin translucent waxed paper. To write, one uses a 
pointed stylus with which one scratches the surface and which forms grooves, which with 
the sheet in contact, form visible traces. To wipe off or erase these traces, one lifts the 
transparent sheet and the contact is interrupted. The traces remain in the slab, but the 
paper and celluloid sheet are again clear to be re-inscribed. Freud saw this as an ideal 
metaphor for the limitless reception of conscious perception, and the capacity of 
indefinite preservation in the unconscious that can be inscribed behind perception with 
indelible memory traces.  
In the essay “Freud and the Scene of Writing”, Derrida (1972a) notes Freud’s reliance 
upon technological writing metaphors when he attempts to describe the action of 
unconscious memory. Derrida (1972a) analyses Freud's use of the “mystic writing pad” 
as a means of explaining unconscious memory as trace/inscription. Derrida (1972a) 
points to Freud’s failure to recognize the existence of more sophisticated archiving 
technologies to use metaphorically, as well as Freud’s lack of awareness of and reliance 
upon such technological metaphors of description. Derrida (1972a) argues that this device 
is used metaphorically as a supplementary machine. In loose Derridean terms, a 
supplement is something that, allegedly secondarily, comes to serve as an aid to 
something ‘original’ or ‘natural’. Supplement has a double meaning here: it is not only 
secondary as a stand-in, a signifier or a representative; it also adds to and modifies.  
In Derrida’s deconstructive terms, the originary form that is favoured (presence, speech, 
essence, the natural) may indeed always be dependent upon, or altered by the supplement. 
In the various pieces where Derrida (1978, 1987, 1998) analyses Freud’s work, a core 
theme is the supplementary representation of the unconscious, and unconscious memory 
in particular, where all manner of technological metaphors are adopted. As described 
earlier, a central theme in Derrida’s analysis will always relate to a key Derridean 
concept: that of différance. Différance is a neologism which simultaneously refers to 
“differing” and “deferral”. It can describe the production of meaning through such 
metaphors: firstly (relating to deferral) there is the notion that metaphors will never fully 
summon forth what they mean, but can only be defined through appeal to additional 
signs, words or metaphors, from which they differ. Thus, meaning is forever “deferred” 
or postponed through an endless chain of signification.  
In a lecture subsequent to “Freud and the Scene of Writing”, “La différance”, Derrida 
(1972b) makes links between Nachträglichkeit and his own concept of différance, which 
has two meanings; the first refers to the determining functions of Nachträglichkeit, 
namely, time and deferral, the second, to difference as differentiality. Now, Derrida here 
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recognizes that the notion of Nachträglichkeit has enabled him to unfold a philosophy of 
the future and not of the past, dialectics or synthesis. He writes:  
 
 
This structure of deferral (Nachträglichkeit) forbids us . . . to consider temporalisation 
(temporisation) as a simple dialectical complication of the living present, an original 
and unceasing synthesis (constantly returned to itself, assembled on itself, assembling) 
of retentional traces and protentional openings (p. 21). 
 
Deferral is adding, supplementing meaning, constituting the present as a form of delay 
beyond or different to apparently immediate temporal present that is illusory. Derrida 
argues that this demonstrates that writing unfolds in a discontinuous time where 
unconscious traces remain and can have a deferred action or presence at any time, but the 
originary nature of those traces, and of temporal presence, is only ever understood 
supplementarily, in the play of différance. 
 
Conclusion 
In all of this, we have arrived at a thinking of time, via Freud’s oeuvre, in which 
Nachträglichkeit, re-presentation, heterochronicity and, finally, différance, can be seen to 
relate to a hermeneutic ontological orientation, extending Heideggerian concepts of Care, 
Umsicht, Entwurfen and being-towards-death, to permit a fuller understanding of 
historicity and potentiality that will be extended in the accompanying article when we 
consider developmental and clinical time. 
 
Ultimately, Heidegger has described the temporality of existence in terms of its futurity, 
its embeddedness in tasks, goals and projects in which there is an intuitive understanding 
of process and outcomes that often defies explicit definition or representation in an 
objective or algorithmic sense. This temporal trajectory of existence fits within the 
broader horizon of mortality, worldhood and sociality from which we can only, in a 
derivative and secondary sense, extract ourselves to theorise or conceptualise ourselves as 
timeless, separate, knowable individuals. In this context, Green has ably developed 
Freudian psychoanalytic theory to uphold the complexity of development and 
background, the double action of the repetition of past in the present and the present 
reconstruction of the past in therapeutic work. Here, the historical or temporal 
unconscious background is an active field of both of the psychopathology and of 
potentiation in the patient’s therapeutic future. And Derrida has upheld the idea that the 
unconscious field or background is ineliminable, always to an extent beyond our 
understanding and always reduced or inextricably altered through our use of technical 
metaphors of interpretation. 
 
With these ideas about temporality in mind, we can now proceed to a further 
consideration of developmental time and the temporal field of psychotherapy. In the 
accompanying article, I will advance a discussion on this topic, focussing, in particular, 
on so-called “borderline” conditions.  
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